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Abstract  
In this paper,we explore a unique exogenous instrument to examine how the intra-familial 
position of women influence health outcomes of their children using micro data from Ghana. 
Using the 2SLS-IV estimation technique, I build a model of household bargaining and child 
health development with perceptions of women regarding wife-beating and marital rape in the 
existence of domestic violence laws, in Ghana. Even though the initial OLS estimates suggest 
that women’s participation in decisions regarding purchases of household consumption goods 
help to improve child health outcomes, the IV estimates reveal that the presence of endogeneity 
underestimates the impact of women’s bargaining power on child health outcomes. Our 
Hausman test for endogeneity also confirms that child-health investment decisions is mediated 
through domestic violence laws, which protect women from physical and sexual abuse in the 
household. Our results are also robust to rural residency and father characteristics controls. 
Keywords: Household Bargaining, Women Empowerment, Child Health Investment, Instrumental 
Variables, Domestic Violence 
JEL Classification:  J12 J13 
 
1. Introduction 
Mothers play a critical role in fostering early childhood development, strongly influencing 
children’s long-term intellectual and physical health (Smith and Haddad, 2000). However, 
despite progress in the last few decades, women continue to be disadvantaged in economic as 
well as familial spheres in many societies, with obstacles ranging from discrimination in the 
labor market, access to credit, to inheritance and ownership rights in the family (World Bank, 
2011).  
The recognition that the unequal distribution of intra-household power may have 
heterogeneous implications for parental investments in children has ignited a growing interest 
in intra-household resource allocation and its implication for developmental outcomes of 
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children. This project revolves around intra-familial position of women in Ghana and its 
implication for early childhood development regarding health.  
A survey of the literature, however, reveals a lack of consensus on the measures of 
bargaining power. In the literature, bargaining power within households has been measured 
using direct and indirect proxies like relative income contribution, educational attainment, and 
direction of dowry, inheritance and ownership rights (e.g. Blumberg, 1988; Anderson and 
Eswaran, 2009; Friedmann-Sanchez, 2006).  The differences in the measures of women’s 
bargaining power may be attributed to the diversity in the political and social institutions and 
norms across countries and cultures.   
 
It is therefore important from a policy point of view to understand the effect of 
women’s bargaining power on early childhood development in each country through the lens of 
the norms and institutions that are peculiar to the culture of that country. 
In this project, I argue that the effect of women’s bargaining power on child health in 
Ghana is mediated through domestic violence laws, which protect women from marital rape 
and wife beating. The choice of domestic violence laws as an instrument for bargaining power 
will enable me to address any endogeneity associated with the direct measure of bargaining 
power. In the literature, when child development outcomes are regressed on direct measures 
such as women’s degree of control over household decisions, they tend to yield biased and 
inconsistent Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates due to the endogeneity of the main 
regressor (Bernal and Keane).  
 
 Endogeneity may arise because in many societies, women with high quality (healthy 
and well-educated) children tend to gain more respect in the family and community, hence 
more bargaining power. In this case, the reverse causality becomes a threat to consistency. 
Endogeneity may also arise because in the Ghanaian society there is a traditional predilection 
for male children. As a result, women with male children tend to have a lot of respect within 
the family, obtain more bargaining power and may be able to invest more in their children 
(especially when they are all males). 
 
To deal with the endogeneity, the 2-Stage Least Squares –Instrumental Variable (2SLS-
IV) estimation technique is employed. I make use of the existence of domestic violence laws 
(which is captured as women’s attitude towards wife-beating for refusing to have sex with the 
husband) as an exogenous instrument for women’s bargaining power.  This instrument is 
exogenous because in jurisdictions like Ghana with judicial systems that protect women’s 
rights, strong incentives exists for women to exercise their rights and participate more actively 
at all levels of decision making. These laws therefore confer bargaining power on women 
independent of the child.  
The Domestic Violence (DV) Law, which has been in enforcement since 2007 contains 
provisions that criminalize various acts of violence – physical, economic and psychological 
abuse, intimidation, and harassment (Manuh, 2007). Therefore, there is an indication of low 
self-esteem or non-empowerment if a woman (even after the passage of this law) believes that 
a husband is justified in beating his wife for refusing sex. Such a perception could act as a 
barrier for women in accessing effective health care for themselves and their children (Ghana 
Demographic and Health Survey, 2008).  
To understand this whole interaction within a structure, this paper develops a model of 
household bargaining with women’s attitude towards wife beating and marital rape and its 
implication for child health outcomes. The implications of the model is tested using the 2008 
Ghana Demographic and Health Surveys (hence GDHS) data.  The choice of Ghana is important 
because it allows me to explore the existence of domestic violence laws as unique instrumental 
variable for the first time in the literature. 
It also helps to provide robust empirical support for designing policy measures targeted 
at bridging gender gaps to affect child development outcomes in Ghana where women lack 
influence in household decision-making, mainly because of strong patriarchal family structures, 
even though, they constitute more than 50% of the population (Baden et al, 1994) 
This is the first paper to explore domestic violence as an instrumental variable for 
women’s bargaining power whilst testing its implications for child health outcomes using a 
unique micro data set.  
 
2. Research Questions  
I have two objectives. First to identify an exogenous instrument for women’s bargaining power 
and to construct a model with this exogenous instrument to examine the effect of this power 
on child health outcomes using micro-level data from Ghana. 
 
3. Literature Review 
a. Theoretical Literature  
Several useful models on intra-household resource allocation and bargaining have emerged 
after a substantial body of literature on household bargaining questioned the validity of the 
traditional unitary household model. The unitary model, which treated household as a single 
unit with common preferences, utility, decisions and choices, has been unable to withstand a 
number of empirical verifications (e.g. Schultz, 1990 and Thomas 1990). 
As a result, there is a growing consensus in the literature that the household behavior 
cannot be modelled as though members of the household had a set of stable preferences. 
However, though there exist several useful alternatives, there is no agreement on the best way 
to model household behavior. Indeed, the literature recognizes that models on household 
bargaining may differ to reflect the social, economic and cultural contexts in which they are 
used (Chiappori et al, 2006). In this section, I provide a brief overview of some of the existing 
models proposed to replace the unitary model. 
Collective Model 
The collective model developed Chiappori, (1988) and restructured by Chiappori et al (2006) 
recognizes individual preferences within a household and enables individual bargaining power 
to influence household choices and outcomes.  The model assumes that regardless of how 
decisions are made, outcomes made under these assumptions are always Pareto efficient. The 
implications of this model have been upheld by several empirical studies (e.g. Vermeulen, 2000) 
 
Non-Cooperative Model 
The non-cooperative model assumes that resources earned by individuals are expended 
according to individual preferences and interests (Ulph, 1988). There exists no pooling of 
resources as it happens in the unitary or cooperative models. There is however, mixed opinions 
in the literature on whether outcomes made under the assumptions of this model are pareto-
efficient (Bourguignon et al (1993) and Udry (1996). 
 
The Cooperative Bargaining Model  
The cooperative bargaining model, also like the collective model, assumes that household 
bargaining outcomes are Pareto-efficient. It however establishes more firmly, the process by 
which the pareto-efficient outcomes are attained, by assuming the presence of a threat point 
for each household member (McElroy and Horney, 1981 and Manser and Brown, 1980). The 
threat point is usually an external utility option to members of the household. An example of 
this outcome is “divorce”, where the threat point for the household is dissolving the marriage. 
The efficiency of divorce as a threat point for intra-household bargaining however remains 
largely debatable ((Lundberg and Pollak, 1993). Per the data used in this paper, household 
decisions are made under of the assumptions of the cooperative bargaining model where 
resources are pooled and decisions made reflect individual preferences. The threat point for 
making pareto-efficient decisions lies in the ability of any ‘abused’ member of the household to 
exploit or use domestic violence laws to seek redress. 
 
b. Empirical Literature  
A number of studies suggest that women’s participation in economic activities is a sustainable 
way to help build human capital in developing countries.  This section surveys the results of 
extant studies, on the subject of intra-household bargaining and child development outcomes.  
Using women’s ethnicity, “arguably”, as an instrument for bargaining power, Lepine and 
Strobl (2013) found that women with bargaining power tend to have children with better 
nutritional status in rural Senegal.  Whilst Ueyama (2006), with household survey data from 
rural Malawi, found that women’s participation in agriculture has a positive effect on child 
health, through the added ‘income effect’ and ‘food effect’. Afridia et al (2012) also studying 
the impact of India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) on children’s 
educational outcomes via women’s labour force participation, found that greater participation 
of mothers in the program was associated with better educational outcomes of their children.  
Similarly, Smith et al. (2003) also using DHS household surveys for 36 South Asian, Sub-
Saharan Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean countries, found a strong association 
between the index of women’s decision-making power and her child’s nutrition. 
 On his part, Kishor (2000) used data from the Egypt’s 1995 DHS and employed 
multivariate analyses to explore the correlations between women’s empowerment and child 
health. The study found that a woman’s lifetime exposure to employment is significantly 
correlated with both child survival and health. 
Furthermore, studies such as Haddad et al. (1997), Thomas (1997), Quisumbing and 
Maluccio (2000), Doss (2001), Duflo and Udry (2004) and Fantahun et al, (2007) also found a 
positive relationship between women’s empowerment and either child development 
outcomes.  
Even though cultural norms and political institutions strongly influence child outcomes 
by either constraining or improving women’s bargaining positions, there exists major gaps, in 
the literature, in spelling out the dynamics of these processes (Agarwal, 1997). This is because, 
majority of the literature has tended to focus on more direct and observable measures such as 
incomes, education, participation in a microfinance program or agriculture etc.  For example, in 
view of the societal preference for male children in China, women with first-born sons have 
been found to have greater bargaining power than women with first-born daughters (Li and 
Wu, 2011). 
This paper thus seeks to fill this gap by investigating how the existence of institutions 
that protect women from domestic violence influence women’s bargaining positions and 
subsequently how this translates into child development outcomes. The implications of this 
model, I believe can be replicated in other societies with little regard to the cultural or 
economic setting of the society. 
c. Domestic Violence Laws 
Like many developing societies with strong patriarchal family structures, marriage in 
Ghana is associated high social esteem.  For many societies, though the certificate of marriage 
confers certain rights and powers on the partners involved, the degree of control over decision 
making within the marriage is unequally shared between partners. 
This is because the customary institution, which represents the primary source of 
legitimacy for most marriages in Ghana, does not view women and men as equal partners in 
marriage. Generally, the woman is expected to be subservient and obedient to the husband, 
and the husband is expected to exercise maximum control to keep the house in order. Derry 
and Diedong (2014), observes that a prime example of this is the traditional right of men to 
discipline their wives through beating. However, this beating should be reasonable, such that it 
does not cause awful physical injuries or death.  Given this cultural foundation, it is not 
surprising that domestic violence was seen as a normal practice and a means of maintaining 
order in the household.  
To control domestic violence, the government of Ghana in February 2007 passed the 
Domestic Violence (DV) Act 732 which mandates the Domestic Violence and Victims Support 
Unit (hence DOVVSU) to fight domestic violence in all its forms and to set up a victim support 
fund to advance that cause (GDHS, 2008). The passage of the DV Act has since criminalized 
most acts of violence against women and children, and has fundamentally changed the 
perception of Ghanaian women on domestic violence, including, making it criminal for husband 
to use force their wives into having sex without consent. This has provided a fundamental 
pathway to empower women by granting women in the household, the right to make choices 
and decisions that best represent their individual interests without fear of abuse from their 
partners.  
Evidence from the literature confirms this assertion. For example, Derry and Diedong 
(2014) using survey data from the Upper West Region of Ghana found that proximity of a 
household to the police or the DOVVSU is negatively related to the occurrence of violence 
within that household and that physical violence has been on a decrease since the passage of 
the law. 
On the back of this information, the paper explores domestic violence laws as an 
exogenous instrument, which confers bargaining power on women independent of child 
outcomes. This helps deal sufficiently with any potential endogeneity of the main regressor. 
 
4. Research Design 
Data and Sampling Techniques 
The study is based on micro level data on Ghana from the 2008 Ghana Demographic and Health 
Survey administered by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The 
survey, which is based on a nationally representative household sample, provides data for 
11,778 households. The survey employed two-stage sample design. The first stage involved 
selecting 412 sample points from an updated master sampling frame constructed for the 2000 
Ghana Population and Housing Census, using systematic sampling with probability proportional 
to size. The second stage involved systematic sampling of 30 of the households listed in each 
cluster. 
On the data collection, three separate questionnaires were used to collect information 
from the selected sample, namely, the Household Questionnaire, the Women’s Questionnaire 
and the Men’s Questionnaire. This paper uses data from the Women’s Questionnaire, which 
was used to collect information from all women age 15-49 in half of the selected households. 
These women were asked questions about themselves and their children born between 2003 
and 2008, on topics including but not limited to education, media exposure, wealth, 
vaccinations and childhood illnesses, marriage, occupation and husband’s background 
characteristics, childhood mortality and domestic violence.  For the purpose of this research, I 
give a brief overview of the key variables of interest as presented in the DHS survey in the 
following section: 
a. Attitude towards Wife Beating and Domestic Violence 
To capture the empowerment effect of gender equity, the survey collects data on women’s 
attitude towards wife-beating and other forms of violence as a proxy for women’s status in the 
household. Respondents were asked whether a husband is justified in beating his wife under a 
series of circumstances: when wife burns the food, when wife argues with him, when wife goes 
out without telling him, when wife neglects the children, and when wife refuses to have sex 
with him. Per the structure of the survey, responses that suggest a justification of wife beating 
by husbands is seen as a reflection of the woman’s low status and empowerment within the 
household. Such views show the acceptance of cultural norms that give men the right to use 
force against women (GDHS, 2008). 
b. Household Decision Making Module 
In addition to measures that sought to capture women’s view on domestic violence, the survey 
collected data on direct measures of women’s empowerment. Respondents were asked about 
who makes the final decisions on the following issues: respondent’s own health care, making 
large household purchases, making household purchases for daily needs, and visiting her family 
or relatives. Having a final say in the decision-making process is the highest degree of 
autonomy. Women are considered to participate in a decision-making if they usually make that 
decision alone or jointly with their husband. Such information provides insight into women’s 
control over their environment and their attitudes towards gender roles, both of which are 
relevant to understanding women’s ability to make independent decisions about their own 
health care and that of their children (GDHS, 2008). 
c. BMI Measurements of Children 
The nutritional status of young children provides a useful gauge for assessing their future health 
and development prospects. But many under-five children in developing countries are often 
exposed to the risks of childhood illnesses and nutritional deficiencies, which significantly affect 
their long-term health development (GDHS, 2008).  This paper uses the Body Mass Index (BMI) 
of children as a measure of their health status. The BMI which is measured as weight adjusted for 
heigh is calculated as weight in kilograms divided by the square of height in meters. The BMI is 
important because it reflects both current and past nutritional investment in children (GDHS, 
2008). Again, the World Health Organization (2006) notes that differences in children's weight 
and height growth, from birth to age five are more influenced by nutrition and healthcare than 
genetics or ethnicity. Even though genetic factors matter for child height, Martorell and Habicht 
(1986) explain that they only become more critical in adolescent years. 
 The GDHS data captures the BMI as a Z-score. The BMI Z-score can be understood as the 
number of standard deviations of child’s BMI, from the average BMI of her reference group. 
The World Health Organization uses the Multi-Centre Growth Reference, which comprises more 
than 8,000 children from Brazil, Ghana is, India, Norway, Oman and the USA, selected because 
they grew up in an environment that is deemed optimal for a child’s growth (WHO, 2006). In 
this data, the Z-score is mathematically given as, 
Z-score=
  Xij     −     µij
σij
, 
Where Xij represents the observed height-adjusted weight (BMI) of child of age i and gender j 
whilst the Uij and σij represents the mean and the standard deviations of the reference group 
with age i and of gender group j.  Based on the classifications of the World Health Organization 
(2006), a child whose BMI is below -2 standard deviations of the reference group’s average BMI 
is considered too thin or underweight for her age and gender while a child is said to be 
overweight if her if her BMI exceeds +2 standard deviations of the reference group’s average 
BMI. In this paper, we expect mother’s bargaining power to be positively associated with a 
child’s BMI or health outcome. 
 
5. Estimation Technique and Methodology 
This paper uses the 2-Stage-Least-Square Instrumental Variable (2SLS-IV) estimation 
approach.  Per this technique, I build three different models at different stages of the 
estimation process. The first model, which is the most parsimonious model, uses to estimate 
the relationship between Child’s BMI Z-score captured as HealthStatusij of child i in household 
j, and the mother’s degree of say, in making decisions on the daily needs for the home, which is 
captured as MumPowerij.  This is represented mathematically as: 
HealthStatusij =α0 + α1MumPower ij + α2FamilyWealth ij + MumEduc ij+ εij. 
Based on the data, I create a dichotomous variable for the main regressor. That is, ins 
measuring women’s bargaining power, a woman who either takes household daily purchases 
decision alone or jointly with the husband is given a value of 1 whilst women who have no say 
at all in making purchases for household daily needs is given a value of 0. Whilst women who 
makes decisions alone possess absolute power on making daily household consumption goods 
decision, the data does not state specifically what degree or proportion of power is exercised 
by women when they make decisions jointly with the husband. For the purpose of this paper, 
we assume that in making joint decisions, women best represent their interests and that of 
their children. 
I expect α1 > 0 so that women’s bargaining power is positively related to a child’s BMI Z-
score. α2 represents the wealth index of the family. It is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
the household is poor whilst α3 captures whether the woman has ever received formal 
education greater than or equal to primary school and the stochastic term εij, represents the 
collective impact of unobserved factors on the child’s BMI Z-score. 
The second model, which represents the first stage of the 2SLS-IV estimation, uses the 
logistic regression to estimate the probability that a woman will have bargaining power, given 
her attitude to wife beating. Here, a woman who think wife beating is justified assumes a value 
of 0 whilst a woman who think it is not justified assumes a value of 1. 
Logit (MumPowerij) =ﻻ0 + ﻻ1Dviolenceij ++ ﻻ2MumEduc ij+ ﻻ3MumEmplo ij+ εij. 
Guided by the literature I expect ﻻ1 >0, that is women who reject domestic violence 
should be associated with bargaining power. ﻻ2 and ﻻ3  controls for the impact of the woman’s 
education and participation in economic activity in determining her bargaining power whilst the 
error term, εij , captures the effects of unobserved factors on women’s bargaining power. If the 
hypothesis holds, in the second stage of estimation, I replace MumPower with the predicted 
value of MumPower in the second stage of the regression model. This yields the following 
model: 
HealthStatusij =α0 + α1PredictedMumPowerij, + α3xij + α4xij+ α5xij+ εij. 
My a priori expectation is that α1>0, and is different from the α1 in the model which means that 
women with bargaining power have children who are likely to have more weight than their 
reference group.  In the third model, I include a set of controls, as robustness check, primarily, 
mothers educational and health characteristics, participation in economic activity, access to 
mass media, household income, demographic and father characteristics, which may affect child 
health through unobserved channels.  The controls are briefly outlined in the ensuing section. 
 
Mother’s Education 
The literature is well replete with evidence on the positive associations between child 
development and maternal education. Education offers an important channel for empowering 
women with the knowledge, skills and self-confidence necessary to participate fully in the 
development process (Promoting Gender Equality, 2013). Educated women are able to make 
informed decisions on their health and that of their household members. Given the pivotal role 
maternal education or the lack thereof, plays in child health development, this paper includes a 
measure that captures whether the mother in question has ever received any form of 
education. This dummy is constructed from the data by assigning 0 women who had no 
education and 1 to those who have obtained either primary, secondary or tertiary education. 
The model does not include measures that captures the individual effects of the different levels 
or stages of education on child health outcomes. Again, there is a possibility that the impact of 
maternal education is underestimated because educated mothers tend to have more surviving 
children and thus the sampling of living children may result in an over-representation of 
children of educated mothers (Desai and Alva 1998).  However, since educated women tend to 
be associated with lower fertility rates than uneducated mothers, I hope that, at best, the two 
effects compensate each other.  
Household Wealth Index 
The model also controls for the general effect of the household income level on the probability 
that the child is anemic. This is done by including the wealth index variable, which is a 
composite measure of a household's cumulative living standard, calculated by using easy-to-
collect data on a household’s ownership of selected assets, access to water and sanitation 
facilities. This index is important because it allows me to tease out the relative impact of 
household income on child health. In the GDHS data, based on the composite score, households 
are classified under 1 of 5 categories in an ascending scale of income namely, poorest, poorer, 
middle, richer and richest. Based on this, I create a dummy to capture poverty which assumes a 
value of 1 if household is poorer or poorest and 0 if household is not 
 
Father’s Educational Characteristics 
Father’s educational characteristics can influence child’s health through multiple channels. 
Educated men are less likely to subject their wives to domestic violence and hence lead to 
greater empowerment of women, which in turn, translates, into better child outcomes. Again, 
educated fathers are on average healthier and are more likely to produce and raise healthy 
children. For instance, Thomas (1994) finds a positive association between child health and 
higher father’s educational attainment. By not controlling for father’s education, the impact of 
mother’s empowerment on child outcomes may be over-estimated. It is therefore important to 
tease out the relative impact of father’s education by including a variable that captures this 
measure. In this paper, I control for father’s educational characteristics by including two 
dummies that capture whether the woman’s partner or husband has had any formal education.  
  
Empirical Findings 
OLS Estimates 
Table III presents the summary of empirical findings from both the initial OLS and the 
Instrumental Variable estimates. The results suggest that all the predictor variables apart from 
mother’s age, participation in economic activity and household wealth are significant in 
explaining the variation in Child BMI. Specifically, the OLS estimation suggests that women who 
take part in making decisions regarding daily household purchases have children whose Body 
Mass Index are about 0.15 standard deviations (SD) greater than the average BMI of their 
reference group and this is significant at about 5%. The OLS estimates also show that a unit 
increase in a mother’s own Body Mass Index (proxy for maternal health) is associated with an 
average of 0.04 standard deviations increase in her child’s BMI whilst increases in mother’s 
years of education and child age also increase child BMI by about 0.19 and 0.09 standard 
deviations respectively.  
 First Stage Logistic Estimation 
The first stage IV estimation results are summarized in Table II.  The results of the first stage 
estimation are consistent with our a priori expectations; women who do not believe that 
domestic violence is justified are likely to have the power to make decisions on daily household 
purchases, either alone or with the husband. The co-efficient of the domestic violence variable 
is 0.85, in the absence of controls and is highly significant below 1%. After controlling for 
woman’s education and her participation in economic activity in the past one year, the co-
efficient of the domestic violence variable falls to 0.68 but still remains highly significant.  Again, 
our endogeneity concerns are shown to be consistent with the first stage estimation, which 
shows that women with female children tend to have lower bargaining power whilst women 
with healthy children (higher BMI Z-scores) tend to have more bargaining power. 
 
Second Stage Estimation 
After replacing mother’s bargaining power with the predicted values of mother’s bargaining 
power (which is domestic violence) from the first stage IV estimation, we find that child Body 
Mass Index increases by about 2.5 SDs for women who have bargaining power and remains 
highly significant. This is about 2.35 SDs higher than the co-efficient of the OLS estimation. In 
this first model of the second stage estimation, we still control for mother’s characteristics of 
health (BMI), years of education, age, and participation in economic activity over the past 12 
months. We also include child age and household poverty to control for the unobserved 
influences of these factors on child health. The results suggest that an increase in a mother’s 
BMI is associated with about 0.05 standard deviations increase in child BMI. An additional year 
in a child’s life also leads to about 0.09 SD increase in the child’s BMI. These findings are all 
consistent with the literature.  Mother’s participation in economic activity is surprisingly found 
to be negatively related to child health outcome and is statistically significant.  
 
Whilst we cannot say much about causality, we assume that happens if women’s participation 
in economic activity, keeps them away from children, to the extent that it becomes detrimental 
to child health. The results also suggest that an increase in a woman’s age is negatively related 
to the health outcome of her child and it is statistically significant. Even though this result 
comes as a surprise, it could also reflect the fact that older women are less acquainted with the 
recent domestic violence laws, and are more in tune with the dictates of the norms and 
traditions, which limit their participation in household decision –making regarding their own 
health and that of their children. Poverty also surprisingly remains insignificant as a 
determinant of child health outcome in both OLS and second stage IV regressions. 
 In the second IV model, we control for the unobserved influences of father’s educational 
characteristics (uneducated father) and age as well the possible impact of rural residency on 
child health. The results, which are also summarized in Table III, suggest that father’s age, 
educational attainment and rural residency have no significant impact on child health. 
However, the co-efficient of the previous variables change. This may suggest that, in the 
presence of an ageing uneducated father in a rural household, mother’s bargaining power 
increases child BMI by some additional 0.6 standard deviation over the reference group, which 
is consistent with the literature. Under these controls, a mother’s age and participation in 
economic activity remain significant and negatively related to her child health whilst child age 
continues to be positive and significant as well but with higher co-efficient. 
Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
To test whether the suspected endogenous variable is indeed endogenous and whether our 
instrumental variable is exogenous, we employ the Hausman test for endogeneity.   To do this, 
we run a reduced form of the baseline regression with Mother’s Power as dependent variable. 
This yields the model. 
 MumPower= π0 + π1X1 ij+ π2X2ij+ π3X3ij+ π4X4ij+ π5X5ij+ π6X6ij+ π7X7ij+ ε 
Where X1 is the domestic violence dummy, X2 is woman’s education in years, X3 is Woman’s 
BMI, X5 is Child Age, X5 is dummy for whether the woman is working, X6 is the woman’s age in 
years, and X7 is the household wealth dummy whilst ε is the error term. Since we suspect that 
the MumPower variable suffers endogeneity from unobserved reverse causation and omitted 
variable bias, we include the residuals from the reduced form equation in the structural form 
regression below,  
 
HealthStatus= Z0 + Z1X1 ij+ Z2X2ij+ Z3X3ij+ Z4X4ij+ Z5X5ij+ Z6X6ij+ Z7X7ij + Z8yi +µ, where Z1, Z2... Z7 
are the explanatory variables in the baseline IV regression, while Z8 is the residuals of the 
reduced form model.  The model is run on the null hypothesis that the yi is statistically 
insignificant and Z8 = 0. If the null hypothesis holds, then MumPower is exogenous and does not 
need IV estimation. However, our Hausman test results, summarized in Table 3.0 of the 
Appendix section, shows that the reduced form residuals are statistically significant and thus 
we reject the null hypothesis that the mother power is exogenous. This also confirms that 
domestic violence dummy is a good instrument for the mother’s bargaining power variable. 
Conclusions 
This paper set-off to investigate the impact of the women’s bargaining power on child health 
outcomes. To achieve this, we build a model of intrahousehold bargaining with perceptions of 
women regarding domestic violence and marital rape, and its implications for child health 
outcomes using the 2-SLS Instrumental Variable technique in order to circumvent endogeneity 
resulting from omitted variable bias and unobserved reverse causality between the dependent 
variable and main regressor.  Our Hausman test for endogeneity confirmed this as a good 
instrument and the IV estimates showed that impact of women’s bargaining power on child 
health is underestimated by the biases in the OLS estimation. We also found consistent with the 
literature that the years of education obtained by a woman and her health status directly 
mattered for the health of her child. Whilst, father’s illiteracy and rural residency and poverty in 
the household do not matter directly for child health, per our sample, we find that the impact 
of women’s bargaining power on child health tend to increase in households where father has 
no education.  
 This paper provides strong empirical evidence for women empowerment in order to 
drive investments in child health especially in countries where strong patriarchal family 
structures that prevent the effective participation of women in the household decision-making 
process. The paper shows that a simple, well-carved legislation that protect women from 
domestic violence and abuse could tremendously improve women’s bargaining positions and 
allow them to independently, make decisions that are in the best interest of themselves and 
their children.  
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 APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1.0 Results of OLS and IV Estimations 
Variable OLS Estimates 2SLS- Model 1  
Instrument = Domestic Violence  
2SLS-Model 2 
Mother’s Power 0.148**       [0.076] 2.528***      [1.231] 3.080*     [1.177] 
Mother’s BMI 0.037***     [0.008] 0.046***      [0.011] 0.051***  [0.014] 
Mother’s Education 0.185***     [0.073] 0.143            [0.095] 0.134        [0.116] 
Mother’s Age -0.004          [0.005] -0.022**       [0.012] -0.036**   [0.016] 
Mother Working -0.068          [0.115] -0.643**       [0.331] -0.778*     [0.448] 
Child Age 0.094***     [0.025] 0.091**         [0.032] 0.098***  [0.037] 
Household Wealth (if Poor) -0.060          [0.074] 0.127             [0.397] 0.036        [0.154] 
Non-Educated Father   -0.098       [0.122] 
Father’s Age   0.009        [0.007] 
Residence (if Rural)   0.170        [0.139] 
Observations 1563 1563 1471 
R-Squared 0.04 … … 
F-Stat /Wald Chi2  9.29*** 42.13*** 39.63*** 
*** Significant at 1%       ** Significant at 5%           *Significant at 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
 
  
 
 
 
Table 2.0 Results of First Stage Logistic IV Regression 
Variable/Predictor of Woman’s Power Co-efficient P-Value Std. Error 
Domestic Violence (No Controls) 0.085*** 0.000 0.019 
Domestic Violence (With Controls) 0.085** 0.002 0.027 
Woman’s Years of Education 0.032 0.147 0.022 
Woman Working 0.235*** 0.000 0.038 
Woman’s Age 0.007*** 0.000 0.001 
Child Gender (if Female) -0.05** 0.025 0.021 
Child BMI 0.84** 0.087 0.008 
Table 3.0 Hausman Test for Endogeneity 
Reduced Form Model (Dependent =Mother’s Power) Structural Equation (Dependent= Child Health) 
Variables  Co-Efficient  [P-Value] Variables Co-Efficient  [P-Value] 
Domestic Violence1 .361 [0.004]** Mother’s Power 1.553[0.009]** 
Woman’s Years of Education 0.543[0.642] Woman’s Years of Education 0.171[0.019]** 
Woman’s BMI -0.013[258] Woman’s BMI 0.039[0.000]*** 
Child Age 0.021[0.147] Child Age 0.086[0.001]*** 
Woman Working 1.241[0.000]*** Woman Working -0.438[0.023]** 
Woman’s Age 0.037[0.000]*** Woman’s Age -0.012[0.046]** 
Household Wealth -.309[0.009]** Household Wealth 0.027[0.740] 
***Significant at 1%, **Significant at 5%  and * at 10%  Reduced Form Residuals2 -0.584[0.017]** 
1 Domestic Violence is statistically significant 2Residuals are statistically significant 
HO = Residual= 0  i.e. Mother Power is exogenous Since The Residuals in the Structural Equation is 
statistically significant at 5% we  H1 = Residual ≠ 0, i.e. Mother Power is endogenous 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 .0 Summary Statistics  
Variable Sample Size Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Child BMI Z-score 1759 -0.54 1.27 -3.94 5.89 
Child Gender Dummy (2 if female, 1 if male) 3299 1.48 0.50 1 2 
Child Age in Years 3128 4.39 5.08 0 30 
Woman’s Age 4916 28.99 9.70 15 49 
Mother Power Dummy  2948 0.78 0.41 0 1 
Woman’s BMI 4814   23.42 4.69 12.18 57.61 
Woman’s Educated Dummy (1 if Yes , 0 if No) 4916 0.75 0.44 0 1 
Woman Working Dummy (=1 if yes, 0 if No) 4916 0.78 0.42 0 1 
Domestic Violence (Dummy) 4916 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Father’s Education Dummy (1 if not educated, 0 if yes) 4916 0.83 0.38 0 1 
Father’s Age in Years 2902 40.23 11.12 18 85 
Household Wealth Status (1 if poor, 0  if not-) 4916 0.409 0.49 0 1 
Residence Dummy (1 if Rural, 0 if Urban) 4916 1.56 0.50 0 1 
